The Berlin Plus Agreement is the summary title of a comprehensive set of agreements concluded between NATO and the EU on 16 December 2002.  These agreements were based on the conclusions of the 1999 NATO summit in Washington, sometimes referred to as the CJTF mechanism, and allowed the EU to use some of NATO`s military means in its own peacekeeping operations. The Berlin Plus Agreement consists of seven main parts:  The agreements are called upon following a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin in 1996, when they declared their readiness to facilitate «the use of separable but non-distinct military capabilities in Western European Union-led operations.» At its 1999 Washington summit, NATO, on the basis of the Berlin decision, recognised «the European Union`s determination to have the capacity to act autonomously» and extended the agreements to the EU. Hence the most. On behalf of the EU, Xavier Solana wrote on 17 March 2003 to NATO Secretary General George Robertson to confirm that work on Berlin Plus between the two organisations had been completed. This comprehensive framework for NATO-EU relations was concluded on 17 March 2003 with the exchange of letters from High Representative Javier Solana and Lord Robertson, then SECRETARY General of NATO.  But something is missing. The most practical and traditional framework for cooperation between the EU and NATO, the «Berlin Plus», seems to have been neglected. Under Berlin Plus, agreed in 2003, the EU can request NATO to make its resources and capabilities available to the EU for a targeted EU-led operation.
In the absence of any mention of Berlin Plus in recent NATO or EU public documents, it would appear that this form of cooperation has been marginalized in favor of seemingly more contemporary topics. As a result, the list of NATO-EU activities does not meet the challenge of NATO and EU military cooperation in a future crisis that would affect both their interests. Since the Berlin Plus agreement in 2003, circumstances have changed dramatically. But in recent times, old debates have resurfaced, showing that the friction that caused Berlin Plus to react persists. U.S. demands for increased European defense spending are more urgent, but its reaction to proposals for military capabilities and EU autonomy reflects suspicions of the past. . . .